



BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC.

ACCUMULATED  
EARNINGS TAX  
("AET") EXPOSURE

STERLING COOPER, INC.  
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## I. Executive Enforcement Thesis

### A. Core Allegation

Berkshire Hathaway is not merely a corporation exercising conservative capital allocation discipline; it is a **deliberately structured earnings-retention vehicle designed to systematically avoid shareholder-level taxation**. The company's financial architecture—defined by decades of uninterrupted accumulation, refusal to distribute dividends, and maintenance of extraordinary liquidity—reflects not incidental behavior but a **coherent and sustained tax posture**.

This posture falls squarely within the prohibitory scope of **Internal Revenue Code §§ 531–537**, which were enacted to prevent precisely this form of abuse: the use of the corporate form as a **shield against the imposition of dividend taxation at the shareholder level**. Congress did not intend to allow controlling shareholders to indefinitely warehouse income within a corporation while deferring personal tax liability. Yet that is the exact economic effect Berkshire has achieved.

The statutory design is intentionally unforgiving. It does not require proof of subjective bad faith or explicit tax-avoidance motive. Instead, it relies on objective indicia—the **scale and persistence of accumulation relative to the reasonable needs of the business**. Where those indicia are present, the law presumes avoidance. Berkshire's financial history does not merely satisfy those indicia; it amplifies them to an unprecedented degree.

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### B. Enforcement Trigger

The triggering conditions for Accumulated Earnings Tax liability are not ambiguous in this case—they are overwhelming.

Berkshire has:

- **Accumulated approximately \$696 billion in retained earnings, and**
- **Refused to pay a dividend for nearly six decades (since 1967)**

This combination—**extreme duration plus extreme magnitude**—is without parallel in modern U.S. corporate history. It is not an edge case; it is a **textbook case, magnified**.



Under **IRC §533(a)**, such accumulation—once shown to exceed the reasonable needs of the business—**automatically gives rise to a presumption of tax-avoidance intent**. This presumption is not rhetorical; it is dispositive unless rebutted with concrete evidence of legitimate business necessity.

The Supreme Court in *United States v. Donruss Co.* made clear that **tax avoidance need only be “a purpose,” not the sole or dominant purpose**, to trigger AET liability. Berkshire’s structure satisfies even this diluted threshold. Where a corporation’s conduct predictably results in massive deferral of shareholder taxation, the inference of purpose is not speculative—it is unavoidable.

### **Operating Subsidiaries Generate Earnings**



**Earnings Flow to Parent**



**NO DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION**



**Earnings Retained & Reinvested**



**Cash + Investments Accumulate**



**Shareholders Receive NO Taxable Income**



**Value Reflected in Share Price**



**Tax Deferred Indefinitely**





(At Death) → Step-Up in Basis



## TAX ELIMINATED ENTIRELY

### Legal Interpretation:

- This loop is precisely what **IRC §531–537 prohibits**
- The **absence of a “break” (dividend event)** is the violation trigger

Similarly, in *Ivan Allen Co. v. United States*, the Court emphasized that the inquiry focuses not on abstract corporate strategy but on **whether liquid assets materially exceed operational requirements**. Berkshire’s own disclosures concede that it maintains cash far in excess of what it considers necessary. This admission alone activates the statutory mechanism.

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### C. Regulatory Objective

The issue presented is no longer confined to Berkshire itself. It is institutional.

Failure to enforce the Accumulated Earnings Tax in this context would constitute a **systemic breakdown in the administration of §§ 531–537**. The statute would be rendered functionally inert, signaling to large corporations that indefinite earnings retention—no matter how disproportionate or prolonged—will not be challenged.

This case therefore presents a **necessary enforcement inflection point**.

It offers regulators an opportunity to:

1. **Reassert the vitality of the AET regime,**
2. **Reaffirm Congressional intent,** and
3. **Prevent the normalization of indefinite tax deferral through corporate accumulation**

Absent enforcement here, the statute risks devolving into a dead letter—observed in theory, ignored in practice.

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## II. Statutory Architecture of the Violation

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### A. IRC §531 – Purpose and Scope

#### 1. Anti-Avoidance Function

IRC §531 imposes a penalty tax on corporations that accumulate earnings **beyond the reasonable needs of the business** for the purpose of avoiding shareholder income tax. Its animating principle is straightforward: **the corporate form must not be used as a reservoir to defer or eliminate individual taxation.**

Courts have repeatedly emphasized that the statute is **remedial and preventative**, not punitive. In *Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner*, the court explained that the AET is designed to counteract “the deliberate accumulation of earnings for the purpose of avoiding surtaxes upon shareholders.” The emphasis is on **economic effect**, not formal justification.

Berkshire’s conduct aligns precisely with the abuse identified in *Smoot Sand & Gravel*: a sustained pattern of accumulation producing **systematic avoidance of shareholder-level taxation.**

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#### 2. Applicability Threshold

The statutory trigger is reached when earnings are retained **beyond the reasonable needs of the business**. This is not a flexible or subjective standard. Courts have consistently required that retained earnings be justified by:

- **Specific,**
- **Definite,** and
- **Feasible** business plans

In *Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner*, the Tax Court articulated a framework for determining reasonable working capital needs. That framework, widely adopted, underscores that **excess liquidity beyond calculable operational requirements is presumptively unreasonable.**



Berkshire's retained earnings and liquidity levels exceed any plausible application of the *Bardahl* formula by orders of magnitude.

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## B. IRC §533(a) – Presumption Mechanism

### 1. Legal Standard

Section 533(a) provides that **the fact of unreasonable accumulation itself establishes a presumption of tax-avoidance purpose**. This is one of the most potent burden-shifting mechanisms in federal tax law.

Once the IRS demonstrates that earnings exceed reasonable needs:

- The burden shifts entirely to the taxpayer
  - The taxpayer must prove absence of tax-avoidance purpose
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### 2. Critical Leverage Point

This presumption eliminates the need for direct evidence of intent. As reinforced in *United States v. Donruss Co.*:

- Even a **partial tax-avoidance motive** suffices
- Courts need not identify primary intent

In practice, this means that Berkshire must do more than articulate a philosophy—it must produce **contemporaneous, objective evidence of concrete business necessity**. Generalized assertions of prudence, flexibility, or opportunism do not meet this burden.

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## C. IRC §537 – Limits on “Reasonable Needs”

### 1. Permissible Categories

Section 537 defines “reasonable needs” narrowly. It includes:



- Working capital requirements
- Planned expansions supported by specific documentation
- Debt obligations and financial contingencies

Each category requires **substantiation and proximity**—not abstract possibility.

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## 2. Impermissible Justifications (Critical to Berkshire's Exposure)

Courts have consistently rejected:

- **Indefinite future plans**
- **Speculative acquisition pipelines**
- **General liquidity preferences**
- **Management philosophy or shareholder ideology**

In *Faber Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner*, the Tax Court held that vague expansion plans lacking specificity do not justify accumulation. Similarly, in *Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner*, the court rejected assertions of future opportunity where no concrete steps had been taken.

Berkshire's publicly stated strategy—waiting indefinitely for large acquisitions—falls squarely within these rejected categories.

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## III. Factual Pattern Establishing Liability

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### A. Dividend Suppression (Primary Indicator)

#### 1. Sixty-Year Non-Distribution Pattern

Berkshire has not paid a dividend since 1967. This is not a temporary policy; it is a **structural refusal to distribute earnings**.



Courts have long treated persistent non-distribution as a key indicator of AET exposure. In *Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner*, the court emphasized that failure to distribute earnings, when combined with substantial accumulation, supports the inference of tax avoidance.

Metric	Amount (USD)	Legal Significance
Retained Earnings	~\$696 Billion	AET Base
Cash & Equivalents	\$150–160 Billion	Excess Liquidity
Required Liquidity (internal)	~\$30 Billion	Benchmark
Excess Cash	~\$120+ Billion	Presumptively unreasonable
Annual Net Income	\$25–35 Billion	Ongoing accumulation
Dividends Paid (since 1967)	\$0	Primary trigger

## 2. Comparative Anomaly

No comparable corporation has:

- Maintained this level of earnings
- Sustained this duration of non-distribution

This absence of peer behavior reinforces the inference that Berkshire’s conduct is **not industry-driven but tax-driven**.

## B. Scale of Accumulation

### 1. Retained Earnings (~\$696B)

The magnitude alone is probative. Courts have repeatedly recognized that **sheer scale can negate claims of necessity**.

## B. Liquidity Mismatch Visualization



### Implication:

- Excess liquidity alone exceeds entire balance sheets of many Fortune 500 companies
- Under *Ivan Allen*, this alone triggers presumption

## 2. Structural and Intentional Pattern

This is not cyclical accumulation tied to market conditions. It is:

- Continuous
- Reinforced annually
- Embedded in corporate policy

Such persistence aligns with the patterns condemned in AET jurisprudence.

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## C. Excess Liquidity Position

### 1. Cash Holdings (\$150–160B)

### 2. Internal Admission Threshold (~\$30B)

The disparity between actual and stated needs is decisive.

In *Ivan Allen*, the Court emphasized that **excess liquid assets are the focal point of analysis**. Berkshire's surplus—exceeding \$100 billion—cannot be reconciled with any reasonable interpretation of operational necessity.

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## D. Absence of Deployment Capacity

### 1. Admissions in Filings

Berkshire has acknowledged:

- Lack of meaningful acquisition opportunities
  - Inability to deploy capital at scale
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### 2. Legal Impact

These statements are not neutral disclosures; they are **affirmative evidence of non-compliance with §537**. Courts require demonstrable plans. Admissions of incapacity negate the existence of such plans.

In *Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. Commissioner*, the court rejected accumulation where the taxpayer could not substantiate specific future use. Berkshire's position is materially weaker.

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## E. Shareholder Tax Shield Effect

### 1. Economic Reality

If Berkshire distributed even a fraction of its accumulated earnings:

- Shareholders would incur **substantial dividend tax liability**
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### 2. Legal Significance

The predictable and sustained avoidance of this liability is not incidental. It is the **economic consequence that defines AET applicability**.

As courts have repeatedly held, where accumulation results in **deferral of shareholder taxation**, and no legitimate business need justifies that accumulation, the statutory purpose of §531 is implicated.



Below is a **fully integrated, enforcement-grade continuation** that weaves **financial data patterns, statutory violations, and hostile case law** into a single prosecutorial narrative. It is written to **collapse abstraction into quantification**, making the scheme **empirically undeniable rather than theoretically arguable**.

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## **2. Functional Outcome: Indefinite Deferral as a De Facto Tax Avoidance Scheme**

The economic consequence of Berkshire's capital policy is neither incidental nor ambiguous. It is a **closed-loop system of indefinite tax deferral** operating with mechanical consistency over decades.

At its core, the structure produces the following outcome:

- Earnings are generated at the operating subsidiary level
- Those earnings flow upward into the parent without distribution
- They are retained, reinvested, or held in liquid form
- Shareholders receive no taxable dividend income
- Tax liability is deferred indefinitely

This is not merely “tax efficiency.” It is a **systematic suppression of realization events**, which is the cornerstone of federal income taxation.

From a quantitative standpoint, the scale of this deferral is staggering:

- Retained earnings approaching **\$696 billion**
- Annual net income frequently exceeding **\$25–35 billion** in recent years
- Dividend distributions: **\$0 over approximately 60 years**

If even a conservative portion of these earnings—say 50%—had been distributed annually, shareholders would have recognized **hundreds of billions in taxable dividend income** over time. At prevailing dividend tax rates (historically ranging from ~15% to 23.8%), the cumulative tax liability deferred is plausibly in the **\$100–\$200+ billion range**.

This is not incidental leakage. It is **systemic tax deferral at scale**.



Courts have consistently recognized that where a corporation's retention policy produces sustained avoidance of shareholder taxation, the AET framework is implicated. In *United States v. Donruss Co.*, the Supreme Court made clear that tax avoidance need only be *a purpose*—not the exclusive or dominant one. Here, the **predictable and continuous tax deferral effect** is so large, so persistent, and so structurally embedded that it cannot be characterized as incidental.

The functional outcome is therefore legally significant:

**Indefinite deferral is not a byproduct—it is the product.**

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Use of Capital	Observed Behavior	Legal Meaning
Dividends	None	Tax avoidance signal
Acquisitions	Sporadic / declining	Weak justification
Organic reinvestment	Limited at scale	Cannot absorb capital
Share buybacks	Active	Surplus admission
Cash retention	Massive	Core violation

#### IV. Constructing the Illegal Scheme

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##### A. Structural Design

Berkshire's conduct is best understood not as a series of isolated decisions, but as a **coherent structural system**. Each component reinforces the others, producing a durable mechanism of tax deferral.

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##### 1. Retain Earnings

The first pillar is **aggressive and continuous earnings retention**.



Financial data reveals:

- Retained earnings growing from modest levels decades ago to **nearly \$700 billion today**
- Year-over-year increases with no structural interruption
- No evidence of cyclical drawdown consistent with genuine capital deployment

This pattern aligns with the behavior condemned in *Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner*, where the court held that sustained accumulation beyond business needs indicates an **intent to avoid shareholder taxation**.

Critically, Berkshire's accumulation is not reactive—it is **policy-driven**.

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## 2. Avoid Dividends

The second pillar is absolute: **zero dividends since 1967**.

This is not a reduction or optimization of payouts. It is a **complete elimination of dividend distribution as a corporate function**.

From a financial perspective:

- Over six decades of earnings have been fully retained
- No partial distribution patterns exist
- No transitional phases or exceptional distributions

Courts have repeatedly treated **persistent non-distribution** as a central indicator of AET exposure. In *Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner*, the court emphasized that failure to distribute earnings, when combined with accumulation, supports a finding of tax avoidance.

At Berkshire's scale, the inference is not merely supported—it is compelled.

**Corporation Generates Earnings**



**Instead of Dividends → Executes Share Buybacks**



↓  
**Only Selling Shareholders Realize Gains**

↓  
**Remaining Shareholders Pay NO TAX**

↓  
**Value Continues to Compound Untaxed**

Mechanism	Tax Outcome
Dividend	Immediate taxation for all
Buyback	Optional / deferred taxation

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### 3. Allow Compounding

The third pillar is **internal compounding of retained earnings**.

By retaining earnings:

- Capital compounds at the corporate level
- Investment gains accrue without triggering shareholder-level tax
- The base for future earnings expands exponentially

This creates a **self-reinforcing accumulation cycle**:

- Retained earnings → increased investment base
- Increased investment base → higher earnings
- Higher earnings → further retention

Over decades, this has produced:

- One of the largest pools of retained capital in corporate history
- A balance sheet where accumulated earnings rival or exceed total equity in many peer firms



This compounding effect magnifies the tax deferral outcome. It transforms what might otherwise be temporary deferral into **permanent non-recognition**.

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#### 4. Defer Shareholder Tax Indefinitely

The final pillar is the **absence of realization events**.

Shareholders are taxed only upon:

- Receipt of dividends, or
- Sale of shares

By eliminating dividends, Berkshire ensures that:

- Taxation is deferred until voluntary disposition
- Long-term holders may never trigger realization
- Gains may ultimately escape taxation entirely (as addressed below)

This structure mirrors the abuse identified in *Ivan Allen Co. v. United States*, where the Court focused on **liquid accumulation enabling tax deferral without business necessity**.

Here, the deferral is not episodic—it is **designed to be indefinite**.

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### B. Control Factor

#### 1. Majority Shareholder Influence

Warren Buffett exercises **extraordinary influence over Berkshire's capital allocation policy**.

This is not a dispersed governance scenario. It is characterized by:

- Centralized decision-making authority
- Long-standing continuity of leadership
- Minimal internal or external pressure to alter dividend policy



Courts have consistently scrutinized accumulation decisions where control is concentrated. In *Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner*, the court noted that accumulation decisions reflecting the preferences of controlling parties—rather than demonstrable business needs—support AET liability.

Here, the continuity of policy over six decades suggests:

- Not independent business judgments
- But a **deliberate, controlled strategy**

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## 2. Alignment of Policy with Tax Outcome

The alignment between Berkshire's policies and the tax benefits to controlling shareholders is exact:

Policy	Tax Effect
No dividends	No current income tax
Earnings retention	Deferral of recognition
Compounding	Expansion of untaxed base
Buybacks (selective)	Optional realization

This alignment is not coincidental. It reflects a structure in which:

- Corporate decisions produce **predictable tax advantages**
- Those advantages accrue disproportionately to long-term controlling shareholders

In *Donruss*, the Court held that where corporate behavior results in shareholder tax avoidance, **purpose may be inferred from effect**. Berkshire's structure produces that effect consistently and at scale.

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## C. Intergenerational Transfer Strategy (Critical Angle)

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### 1. Deferred Gains → Step-Up in Basis

Under current law, appreciated assets held until death receive a **step-up in basis**. This means:

- Unrealized gains are **never taxed**
- Heirs receive assets at fair market value
- The entire history of deferred income is effectively erased

When combined with Berkshire's no-dividend policy:

- Earnings are never distributed
- Gains remain embedded in share price
- Tax liability is deferred indefinitely
- Ultimately extinguished at death

This creates a **complete tax-elimination pathway**, not merely deferral.

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### 2. Avoidance of Lifetime Taxation

From a financial perspective:

- A shareholder holding Berkshire stock for decades may receive substantial economic benefit
- Without ever incurring dividend tax
- And without realizing capital gains

This is not theoretical. It is the **observable outcome** of the structure.

Courts have recognized that accumulation strategies enabling avoidance of shareholder tax obligations fall within the scope of AET. The persistence and scale here elevate the issue from marginal to systemic.

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### 3. Estate Planning Overlay

The interaction between:

- Earnings retention
- Compounding
- Step-up in basis

creates what is effectively an **estate planning instrument embedded within a public corporation.**


The result:

- Wealth accumulates tax-deferred
- Transfers inter-generationally tax-free (income tax)
- Circumvents the normal operation of dividend taxation

This is not a peripheral consequence. It is the **logical endpoint of the structure.**

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#### Earnings Generated





### Key Insight:

This is not deferral.

- It is **permanent tax avoidance via structural design**

## V. Failure to Meet “Reasonable Needs” Standard

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### A. Working Capital Analysis

Berkshire’s liquidity position alone is sufficient to establish excess accumulation.

Financial data shows:

- Cash and equivalents routinely in the **\$150–160 billion range**
- Internal statements indicating **~\$30 billion** as sufficient operational buffer

This implies:

- **\$120+ billion in excess liquidity**

Under the *Bardahl* framework and reaffirmed in *Ivan Allen*, working capital needs must be:

- Quantifiable
- Operationally justified

Excess beyond those needs is presumptively unreasonable.

In *Bardahl Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner*, the court developed a formulaic approach to working capital. Berkshire’s liquidity exceeds any reasonable application of that framework by multiples.

In *Ivan Allen Co. v. United States*, the Supreme Court emphasized that **liquid assets—not total capital—are the critical measure**. Berkshire’s liquid position alone triggers scrutiny.

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# Quantifying the AET Exposure

## A. Step 1: Define Accumulated Earnings Base

Component	Amount
Total Retained Earnings	\$696 Billion
Less: Generous Working Capital Allowance	(\$50 Billion)
Less: Hypothetical Expansion Buffer	(\$50 Billion)

### Adjusted Excess Accumulation:

☐ ~\$596 Billion

## B. Step 2: Apply AET Rate (20%)

$0.20 \times 596 \text{ billion}$

Estimated AET Liability:

👉 ~\$119.2 Billion

## C. Scenario Sensitivity Table

Scenario	Excess Earnings	AET @ 20%	Notes
Conservative	\$300B	\$60B	Minimal enforcement stance
Moderate	\$500B	\$100B	Likely realistic
Aggressive	\$596B	\$119B+	Strong statutory application
Full Exposure	\$696B	\$139B	Maximum interpretation



## D. Add Interest & Penalties (Illustrative)

Assume:

- Multi-year accumulation
- Interest + penalties  $\approx$  25–40%

Base Tax	+30% Add-ons	Total Exposure
\$60B	\$18B	\$78B
\$100B	\$30B	\$130B
\$119B	\$36B	~\$155B

## B. Expansion Justification Failure

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### 1. No Identifiable Projects

Courts require:

- Specific projects
- Documented plans
- Defined capital requirements

Berkshire offers:

- Generalized statements about future opportunities
- No binding commitments
- No project-level disclosures

In *Faber Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner*, vague expansion plans were rejected as insufficient. Berkshire's position is materially weaker.

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### 2. No Timelines

A valid business need must be:

- Immediate or reasonably proximate



Indefinite timelines fail this requirement.

Berkshire's disclosures repeatedly emphasize:

- Waiting
- Patience
- Opportunism

These are not timelines. They are **deferrals of decision-making**.

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### **3. No Capital Commitments**

Courts look for:

- Board resolutions
- Financing arrangements
- Contractual obligations

Berkshire presents none at the scale of its accumulation.

In *Motor Fuel Carriers, Inc. v. Commissioner*, lack of concrete commitment undermined the taxpayer's position. Berkshire's absence of commitments is more pronounced.

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## **C. Acquisition Argument Collapse**

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### **1. Lack of Execution**

Berkshire's acquisition narrative is contradicted by:

- Limited large-scale acquisitions in recent years
- Persistent growth of cash balances

Failure to execute undermines claims of genuine intent.

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## 2. Public Admissions of Scarcity

Berkshire has acknowledged:

- Difficulty finding suitable acquisitions
- Inability to deploy capital

These are not defenses—they are **admissions that no qualifying business need exists.**

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## 3. Hypothetical ≠ Statutory Need

Courts have repeatedly held:

- Hypothetical opportunities do not justify accumulation

In *Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner*, speculative expansion plans were rejected outright.

Berkshire's reliance on:

- Potential future deals
- Undefined opportunities

falls squarely within this prohibited category.

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## Closing Synthesis of This Section

When financial reality is integrated with legal standards, the conclusion is inescapable:

- Berkshire retains earnings at **unprecedented scale**
- Maintains liquidity far beyond operational need
- Lacks specific, actionable deployment plans
- Produces continuous shareholder tax deferral
- Aligns policy with controlling shareholder benefit



Under established case law and statutory design, this is not defensible accumulation.

## Pattern Recognition Dashboard

Indicator	Berkshire Status	AET Risk Signal
Dividend History	0 since 1967	Extreme
Retained Earnings	\$696B	Extreme
Liquidity Excess	\$120B+	Extreme
Deployment Capacity	Limited	High
Buybacks	Active	Confirmatory
Tax Effect	Massive deferral	Triggered

It is precisely the condition that triggers—and justifies—the Accumulated Earnings Tax.

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### D. Insurance Float Argument Neutralized

Berkshire's most frequently invoked structural justification—the existence of insurance “float”—does not withstand legal or financial scrutiny under the Accumulated Earnings Tax framework. Properly understood, the float argument is not merely weak; it is **categorically inapplicable to the statutory inquiry**.

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#### 1. Float Already Regulated

Insurance float represents policyholder funds held temporarily between premium collection and claims payment. These funds are:

- Subject to **strict regulatory oversight** at the subsidiary level
- Governed by **state insurance capital and solvency requirements**
- Already embedded within **statutory accounting frameworks**



Crucially, the float is not discretionary corporate surplus. It is:

- Operationally constrained
- Actuarially determined
- Legally segregated in purpose

Courts have repeatedly emphasized that **externally constrained capital cannot justify discretionary accumulation at the parent level**. In *Ivan Allen Co. v. United States*, the Supreme Court rejected attempts to justify accumulation based on generalized capital considerations, instead focusing on **what portion of liquid assets is actually required for business needs**.

Float, by definition, is already accounted for within those needs. It cannot be **double-counted** to justify further accumulation.

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## 2. Separate from Retained Earnings

The legal flaw in Berkshire's position lies in conflation.

Float:

- Arises from insurance operations
- Exists as a liability offset by investment assets

Retained earnings:

- Represent accumulated after-tax corporate profits
- Are entirely discretionary

The two are analytically distinct. Under IRC §537, the inquiry is limited to **earnings accumulated beyond reasonable needs**, not to operational liabilities or regulated capital pools.

In *Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner*, the court rejected attempts to blur categories of capital to justify accumulation, emphasizing that **only genuine business needs tied to earnings retention are relevant**.

Berkshire's retained earnings—approaching \$696 billion—exist independently of float. The presence of float does not explain, justify, or diminish that accumulation.



### 3. Magnitude Mismatch

Even if float were relevant—which it is not—the **scale disparity is dispositive**.

- Float fluctuates with underwriting cycles
- Retained earnings have grown relentlessly over decades
- Cash and liquid assets alone routinely exceed **\$150–160 billion**, with internal acknowledgment that **~\$30 billion suffices operationally**

This leaves:

- **\$120+ billion in excess liquidity**
- Hundreds of billions more embedded in accumulated earnings

No plausible actuarial or regulatory framework can justify this magnitude.

Courts have consistently treated **excess liquidity at this scale as affirmative evidence of unreasonable accumulation**. In *Ivan Allen*, the Supreme Court focused precisely on this mismatch—finding that when liquid assets materially exceed needs, **the statutory presumption is triggered**.

Here, the mismatch is not marginal. It is **orders of magnitude**.

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## VI. Affirmative Evidence of Surplus Capital

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### A. Share Repurchase Activity

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#### 1. Economic Meaning

Berkshire's share repurchase activity is among the most revealing indicators of surplus capital.

Economically, a share repurchase communicates a single, unambiguous message:

The corporation has capital that it **cannot deploy productively within the business**.



If capital were required for:

- Operations
- Expansion
- Acquisition

it would not be returned to shareholders in any form.

Financial data confirms:

- Billions of dollars deployed in buybacks in recent years
- Repurchases occurring alongside **record levels of retained earnings and liquidity**

This combination is fatal to any claim of necessity. It demonstrates:

- Not capital scarcity
- But capital redundancy

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## 2. Legal Interpretation

Courts have long treated distributions—whether labeled dividends or otherwise—as evidence that earnings are not required for business needs.

In *United States v. Donruss Co.*, the Supreme Court emphasized that **the effect of corporate actions on shareholder taxation is central to AET analysis**. Where funds are returned to shareholders while earnings continue to accumulate, the inference is clear: **the retained portion is not needed for business purposes**.

Similarly, in *Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner*, the court viewed capital movements inconsistent with claimed business needs as undermining the taxpayer's position.

Buybacks, in this context, are not neutral capital allocation tools. They are:

- Evidence of surplus
- Evidence of absence of need
- Evidence of deliberate structuring



## B. Buybacks as Dividend Substitutes

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### 1. Tax Deferral Mechanism

Unlike dividends, which are taxed upon receipt, share repurchases:

- Allow shareholders to **choose whether to participate**
- Permit continued holders to **avoid realization entirely**

This transforms buybacks into a **selective distribution mechanism** that:

- Mimics economic value transfer
- Avoids mandatory taxation

From a tax perspective, this is not incidental—it is **functionally equivalent to dividend avoidance**.

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### 2. Avoidance of Immediate Taxation

Under a dividend regime:

- All shareholders receiving distributions incur tax liability

Under a buyback regime:

- Only selling shareholders realize gains
- Non-selling shareholders defer indefinitely

This asymmetry is critical. It enables:

- Continued compounding of untaxed value
- Strategic realization timing
- Potential elimination of tax through basis step-up

Courts have recognized that **structures enabling selective or deferred realization support AET inference**. The focus is not form, but **tax effect**.

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### 3. Reinforces AET Trigger

The coexistence of:

- Massive retained earnings
- Zero dividends
- Active share repurchases

creates a **triangulated evidentiary pattern**:

1. Earnings are not distributed
2. Capital is nonetheless returned selectively
3. Taxation is minimized or deferred

This pattern reinforces—not rebuts—the §533 presumption.

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## VII. Collapse of Anticipated Rebuttals

*(Deliberately framed without deference)*

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### A. “Capital Allocation Philosophy”

Berkshire’s invocation of a “philosophy” of reinvestment is legally irrelevant.

The Internal Revenue Code does not recognize:

- Management preference
- Corporate ideology
- Investment doctrine

as substitutes for statutory compliance.

In *Faber Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner*, the court rejected generalized business rationales unsupported by concrete plans.

A philosophy is not a plan. It is not evidence. It is not a defense.



## B. “Long-Term Value Creation”

The assertion that retained earnings create long-term shareholder value fails as a matter of law.

Section 537 requires:

- Immediate or reasonably foreseeable business needs
- Not abstract value maximization

Courts have consistently refused to equate:

- Profitability
- Growth
- Market performance

with statutory justification for accumulation.

A corporation may be successful and still violate the AET. Indeed, success magnifies the violation when it results in **greater accumulations and greater tax deferral.**

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## C. “Market Timing / Optionality”

The argument that Berkshire must retain capital to seize future opportunities is explicitly foreclosed by precedent.

In *Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner*, speculative future opportunities were rejected as insufficient.

The law requires:

- Specificity
- Feasibility
- Temporal proximity

“Optionality” satisfies none of these.

It is, in legal terms, **indefinite accumulation by another name.**



#### D. “Shareholder Preference”

The notion that shareholders prefer retention is irrelevant.

The AET exists precisely because:

- Shareholders may prefer tax deferral
- Corporations may accommodate that preference

Congress rejected this dynamic.

In *Donruss*, the Court confirmed that:

- Even partial tax-avoidance purpose is sufficient
- Shareholder benefit reinforces, rather than negates, liability

The statute overrides preference. That is its function.

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#### VIII. Pattern Recognition: Hallmarks of AET Abuse

Berkshire does not merely exhibit isolated indicators of AET exposure. It **aggregates every hallmark of abuse recognized in jurisprudence.**

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##### A. Duration

- Multi-decade accumulation
- Continuous since 1967
- No interruption or corrective action

Courts treat sustained duration as evidence of **structural intent**, not temporary necessity.

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## B. Magnitude

- ~\$696 billion in retained earnings
- Among the largest accumulations in corporate history

Scale alone, in multiple cases, has been sufficient to undermine claims of reasonableness.

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## C. Inaction

- Persistent inability to deploy capital
- Admissions of limited opportunities
- Growth of idle or low-yielding assets

Failure to act is treated as evidence that:

The asserted need does not exist.

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## D. Tax Effect

- Systematic avoidance of dividend taxation
- Indefinite deferral
- Potential elimination via basis step-up

This is the precise outcome the AET was enacted to prevent.

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## IX. Quantifying Exposure

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### A. Accumulated Earnings Base

The foundation of AET liability is the accumulated earnings base:

- Approximately **\$696 billion**



Even conservative adjustments for:

- Reasonable working capital
- Limited contingencies

leave **hundreds of billions subject to scrutiny.**

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### **B. AET Rate Application**

Under current law:

- AET imposed at **20%**

Applied to even a fraction of excess accumulation, the liability is enormous.

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### **C. Implied Liability**

Illustrative scenarios:

- If \$300B deemed excessive → **\$60B tax exposure**
- If \$500B deemed excessive → **\$100B tax exposure**

These figures exclude:

- Interest
- Penalties
- Compounding effects

The potential liability is therefore plausibly in the **hundreds of billions.**

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### **X. Regulatory Failure & Enforcement Gap**

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## **A. Lack of IRS Action**

Despite:

- Scale
- Duration
- Visibility

there has been no meaningful AET enforcement action.

This absence cannot be reconciled with statutory intent.

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## **B. Systemic Risk**

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### **1. Precedent Setting**

Non-enforcement signals:

- That indefinite accumulation is permissible
- That size confers immunity

This invites replication.

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### **2. Erosion of Tax Base**

If replicated broadly:

- Dividend taxation becomes optional
- Corporate form becomes a universal deferral vehicle

The long-term effect is:

- Structural erosion of federal revenue
-



### **C. Statutory Mandate**

The AET is not discretionary.

IRC §531 imposes a duty:

- Where conditions are met
- Enforcement must follow

Failure to act is not neutrality. It is **noncompliance with statutory command.**

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## **XI. Policy & Public Interest Argument**

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### **A. Fairness Principle**

Ordinary taxpayers:

- Recognize income when received
- Cannot defer indefinitely

Berkshire's structure allows:

- Ultra-large deferral
- Potential elimination of tax

This disparity undermines:

- Horizontal equity
  - Public confidence in the tax system
- 

### **B. Integrity of Tax System**

A statute unenforced is a statute repealed in practice.

If Berkshire's conduct is permitted:



- AET becomes symbolic
  - Compliance becomes optional
- 

### **C. Congressional Intent**

Congress enacted the AET to prevent:

- Earnings hoarding
- Dividend suppression
- Shareholder tax avoidance

Berkshire's structure aligns precisely with these concerns.

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### **Enforcement Impact Model**

#### **A. If IRS Acts**

- Immediate:
  - \$100B+ potential recovery
- Long-term:
  - Restores AET credibility
  - Forces dividend normalization

#### **B. If IRS Does NOT Act**

**Berkshire Model** → Becomes Blueprint



Other Corporations Replicate



Dividend Tax Base Collapses



AET Becomes Meaningless



## **XII. Call to Action: Commissioner-Level Intervention**

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### **A. Immediate Actions Requested**

1. Initiate formal AET examination
  2. Require justification under §537
  3. Reconstruct accumulated earnings base
- 

### **B. Investigative Focus Areas**

- Internal capital allocation memoranda
- Board-level dividend deliberations
- Acquisition pipeline documentation
- Liquidity management policies

These materials will reveal:

- Whether plans exist
  - Or whether accumulation is policy-driven
- 

### **C. Enforcement Outcomes**

- Assessment of AET liability
- Imposition of penalties and interest
- Establishment of precedent

This case has the potential to:

- Define modern AET enforcement
  - Reset compliance expectations
-



### **XIII. Conclusion: The Case for Enforcement**

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#### **A. Convergence of Factors**

- Duration
- Scale
- Admissions
- Inactivity

Each independently supports AET exposure. Together, they **compel it**.

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#### **B. Legal Threshold Clearly Met**

- Accumulation exceeds reasonable needs
- §533 presumption triggered
- Rebuttal unsupported by evidence

Under established law, the conclusion is not debatable.

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#### **C. Urgency**

Failure to act here has consequences beyond this taxpayer:

It converts the Accumulated Earnings Tax from enforceable law into historical artifact.

At this scale, in this case, with this record:

**Non-enforcement is indistinguishable from repeal.**



# Shareholder-Level Tax Avoidance Quantification

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## A. Hypothetical Dividend Scenario

Assume:

- 50% of retained earnings distributed over time
- Dividend tax rate  $\approx 20\%$

$(0.20 \times (0.50 \times 696 \text{ billion}))$

**Deferred Shareholder Tax:**

~\$69.6 Billion

## B. Full Distribution Scenario

$0.20 \times 696 \text{ billion}$

~\$139.2 Billion in avoided shareholder taxes

## C. Combined System Impact

Category	Amount
AET Exposure	\$100B–\$140B
Shareholder Tax Avoided	\$70B–\$140B
Total System Impact	\$170B–\$280B+



## The Case in One Table

Factor	Observation	Legal Outcome
Duration	60 years	Structural intent
Scale	\$696B	Unreasonable accumulation
Liquidity	Excess \$120B+	Presumption triggered
Behavior	No dividends	Core violation
Actions	Buybacks	Surplus confirmed
Effect	Tax deferral	AET purpose satisfied